As Nigeria undertakes a historic reform of its policing architecture, the focus must extend beyond decentralising power to democratising accountability. A decentralised police system without democratic oversight merely relocates power; it does not inherently improve policing. However, a decentralised police service anchored on broad-based democratic accountability can transform policing into a truly public institution that serves, protects, and earns the trust of Nigerians.
Decentralisation as a Response to Security Challenges
Olumide Fred’ Adetiba, Executive Director of Madiba Foundation for Good Governance, argues that many of Nigeria’s pressing challenges are rooted in its governance structures. He supports the present administration’s far-reaching reforms, particularly decentralising the Nigeria Police to address the worsening security situation. The debate over state police is not new; it has recurred for over four decades. Before the 1966 military coup, Nigeria operated a decentralised policing system comprising national, regional, and native authority police. The military abolished these structures and centralised policing under the Nigeria Police Force. With the return to democratic rule in 1999 and renewed calls for true federalism, the demand for state police has grown stronger, driven by the country’s deteriorating security landscape and the limitations of a centralised system.
Ineffectiveness of Centralised Policing
One of the strongest arguments for state police is the inability of the current Nigeria Police Force to effectively secure a vast and diverse country. With a landmass of over 900,000 square kilometres and a population exceeding 200 million, Nigeria is too large for a centrally controlled police institution with inadequate personnel and resources. This has led to vast ungoverned spaces exploited by criminal elements. Additionally, concentration of command and decision-making at the centre delays responses and weakens policing at state and community levels.
Addressing Concerns of Abuse
Opposition to state police often centres on fears that governors may abuse the institution for political purposes, as some regional governments reportedly did before the 1966 coup. While these concerns are valid, Adetiba asserts they are not sufficient grounds to maintain the current centralised arrangement. No governance system is entirely abuse-proof; even under the present structure, the police have been used by powerful actors to intimidate opponents. The real question is whether institutions can be designed with robust safeguards that make abuse more difficult while ensuring accountability to the people.
Proposed Oversight Structures
Under the proposed reforms, the Nigeria Police Council will be replaced by a National Police Council with oversight responsibilities for both federal and state policing structures. However, the composition of this body deserves careful scrutiny. The existing council comprises the president, state governors, the chairman of the Police Service Commission, and the Inspector-General of Police. This arrangement is essentially internal governmental oversight with little direct representation of society.
The version of the constitutional amendment bill earlier passed by the House of Representatives proposed a more democratic model, including representatives from the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), traditional rulers, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), and two representatives of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). This broadens accountability beyond government and creates space for organised civil society to participate in police governance.
Executive Bill Weakens Accountability
Unfortunately, the Executive Bill transmitted by the president weakened this framework. It removes representatives of the NUJ and traditional rulers from the proposed National Police Council and reduces NHRC representation from two members to one. More concerning, the Executive Bill leaves the composition of the State Police Service Commission to be determined by an Act of the National Assembly, postponing a fundamental governance issue. Adetiba argues that democratic accountability is essential at both federal and state levels.
Case for Civil Society and Youth Inclusion
Adetiba believes the National Assembly should retain the broader, more representative framework originally proposed by the House of Representatives for both the National Police Council and the State Police Service Commission. Including organised civil society in the accountability structure is necessary to strengthen public confidence, improve transparency, encourage better decision-making, and ensure policing remains people-centred. He also makes a strong case for youth representatives, noting that young people constitute the largest demographic and interact with the police most frequently. Their inclusion would foster constructive dialogue and improve the legitimacy of the new policing system.
Ultimately, democratic accountability should become a defining principle for all public institutions in Nigeria. Accountability structures should create space for citizens, organised civil society, professional bodies, youth, labour, traditional institutions, and other stakeholders. When public institutions are accountable to the people, they become more responsive, transparent, and effective, rebuilding public trust indispensable to democratic governance.
