The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Justice John Terhemba Tsoho, issued the Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions (Amendment), 2026, effective 14 July 2026, introducing sweeping procedural changes designed to ensure pre-election disputes are resolved before the 16 January 2027 general elections. The instrument amends the earlier 2026 Practice Directions and is anchored on Section 285(9), (10), and (14) of the Nigerian Constitution, alongside Sections 29(5) and 88(2) of the Electoral Act, 2026.
The amendment arrives roughly six months before the ballot, a timing that the judiciary describes as deliberate. Nigerian election law treats pre-election matters—nomination, disqualification, false declarations, and primary disputes—as urgent questions that must be settled before voting day. The Constitution insists that pre-election suits be filed within 14 days of the disputed event, and that courts deliver judgment within 180 days of filing. With political parties required to submit candidate lists at least 120 days before the election, any procedural delay can effectively extinguish a claim.
Key Changes in the Amendment
Perhaps the most visible innovation is access. Paragraph 6 now directs all Federal High Court registries to open on Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. exclusively for filing pre-election matters. Previously, a weekend closure could consume part of the 14-day window, making compliance impossible. The new rule converts the constitutional right of access into a practical one.
Paragraph 7 retains the originating summons route but adds a safeguard for contested facts: where fraud, forgery, or similar allegations arise, parties must file written depositions in addition to supporting affidavits, and those depositions can be cross-examined. The same paragraph now mandates that any litigant challenging the conduct or outcome of a party primary must join all necessary parties at the outset, closing a delay tactic that previously allowed respondents to raise joinder objections late in the proceedings.
Service of process is modernised under Paragraph 8, which permits electronic mail and other electronic means for the Court to inform counsel of urgent hearings, provided at least 48 hours’ notice is given. Paragraph 10 authorises virtual hearings, while Paragraph 9 empowers the Chief Judge to assign and transfer pre-election matters across Judicial Divisions, balancing caseloads against the 180-day deadline.
Stricter Hearings and Adjournment Discipline
Paragraph 11 requires cases to be set down within seven days of the close of pleadings, caps adjournments at two per party except for change of counsel, and bars adjournment applications on a day fixed for hearing. It also restates Section 285(8) of the Constitution: preliminary objections and interlocutory rulings on jurisdiction are suspended and delivered at the final judgment stage, subject to proof of proper service. Paragraph 12 extends this discipline to all interlocutory applications, fixing five days for a response and three for a reply, and authorises costs against any party or counsel found to have brought an application merely to delay proceedings.
Judicial Precedents Underpinning the Amendment
These changes do not emerge from a vacuum. Courts have repeatedly interpreted the underlying provisions with increasing strictness. In Garba v Adua (2011) and Monguno v APC (2019), the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal upheld the 14-day deadline as absolute. In Lokpobiri v APC, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Interpretation Act’s date-exclusion rule, confirming the clock cannot be stretched. Paragraph 6’s weekend registry access is the judiciary’s procedural response to a deadline it has refused to extend by interpretation.
On the hostile-facts test for originating summons, the case law is more uneven. The Supreme Court in Ejike Oguebego v PDP and in PDP v Degi-Eremienyo (2021) has split from the Court of Appeal over when facts are truly contentious. Paragraph 7’s deposition-and-cross-examination hybrid is a procedural workaround, grafting trial-like safeguards onto summary procedure rather than forcing litigants into a full writ action.
Legal Limits of a Practice Direction
A Practice Direction does not carry the force of statute, as the Supreme Court made clear in University of Lagos v Aigoro (1985) and Nigerian Airports Authority v Okoro (1995). Where it conflicts with the Rules of Court or the Constitution, the latter prevail. This means Paragraph 7’s deposition requirement could be challenged as an improper extension of the rule-making power, although it likely survives because it supplements rather than displaces the Civil Procedure Rules. Paragraph 11(3) is safer because it simply restates the Constitution.
Costs as Deterrence
The costs sanction in Paragraph 12(5) follows an unmistakable trend. In February 2020, after nullifying the APC’s Bayelsa State governorship victory, the Supreme Court ordered two Senior Advocates to personally pay ₦30 million each for a vexatious review application. In 2023, it awarded ₦40 million against PDP counsel in Imo State litigation. Those awards relied on the Court’s inherent jurisdiction; Paragraph 12(5) now gives Federal High Court judges an explicit first-instance hook to punish delaying tactics before they consume the 180-day clock.
Living Constitutional Tension
The amendment also intersects with live litigation over the Electoral Act itself. In July 2026, the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, in Zenith Party v INEC (CA/ABJ/CV/750/2026), struck down Sections 77(5)-(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act, 2026, ruling them inconsistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of party autonomy. That decision directly affects disputes over primary registers and procedure, meaning trial judges applying Paragraph 7 may now also have to grapple with whether the statutory yardstick for a challenge remains valid. Practitioners must monitor this case closely.
Implications for Practitioners
For lawyers handling pre-election matters, the takeaways are concrete. First, calendar the 14-day window from the event date and file within it, regardless of weekends—the case law and Paragraph 6 both point to no excuses. Second, join every necessary party at the outset to avoid fatal objections later. Third, prepare depositions capable of surviving cross-examination whenever fraud or forgery is alleged. Fourth, treat every interlocutory application with the assumption that its timing will be scrutinised under Paragraph 12(5). Fifth, where a primary challenge relies on statutory provisions now under constitutional attack, build alternative legal arguments rather than resting solely on the affected sections.
Ultimately, the 2026 Amendment is a housekeeping instrument with high stakes. It does not alter substantive electoral law, and it cannot fix the structural mismatch between the 120-day nomination window and the cumulative timelines for trial and appeal. What it does is strip away procedural excuses—late filing, registry inaccessibility, adjournment gamesmanship, and interlocutory delay. Whether that proves sufficient to ensure pre-election disputes are genuinely resolved before the votes are cast will be tested as the 2027 cycle unfolds.
