A heated legal debate is unfolding over the interpretation of Section 83 of the Electoral Act 2026, a provision designed to restrict court involvement in internal political party disputes. Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Monday Ubani, has cautioned against an overly broad reading of the clause, arguing that it contradicts the Constitution and could undermine the rule of law.
Background of the Controversy
The disagreement began when fellow lawyer Festus Okoye suggested that lawyers have become scapegoats in intra-party conflicts due to their frequent resort to the courts. Okoye's remarks prompted Ubani to issue a detailed rebuttal, warning that excluding judicial oversight from party affairs would leave aggrieved members without legal remedies.
Constitutional Supremacy Argument
Ubani emphasized that Section 83(5), when read in isolation, appears to bar courts from entertaining disputes arising from political parties' internal affairs. However, he argued that this interpretation fails to align with the broader constitutional framework. He pointed to Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which grants courts the power to adjudicate on matters concerning civil rights and obligations. Additionally, he cited the supremacy clause in Section 1(3), noting that any statutory provision inconsistent with constitutional guarantees must give way.
"Any attempt, however framed, to exclude judicial intervention where legal rights are violated remains constitutionally questionable," Ubani maintained.
Judicial Precedents
Drawing on established Nigerian jurisprudence, Ubani referenced landmark decisions such as Lakanmi v AG (Western State), AG Federation v Abubakar, and Abaribe v Speaker, Abia State House of Assembly, where courts firmly asserted their authority and resisted legislative attempts to shield institutions from scrutiny. He acknowledged that courts have traditionally exercised restraint in party matters, as seen in Okafor v Onuoha, but insisted that such restraint is based on prudence, not an absolute prohibition.
"Once disputes transcend internal party mechanisms and involve breaches of statutory provisions, constitutional rights, or electoral laws, judicial intervention becomes not only appropriate but necessary," Ubani said.
Consequences of an Absolute Bar
Ubani warned that interpreting Section 83 as an absolute bar could have far-reaching consequences, effectively leaving aggrieved party members without remedy in cases of exclusion, manipulation of primaries, or outright illegality. Such an outcome, he argued, would undermine the foundational legal principle ubi jus ibi remedium — where there is a right, there must be a remedy.
He proposed a more balanced reading of the provision, suggesting that its true intent is to discourage frivolous litigation, curb forum shopping, and promote internal dispute resolution mechanisms within political parties, not to extinguish the courts' constitutional mandate.
Concerns Over Penal Provisions
The senior advocate also raised concerns about penal implications in the section that appear to target lawyers and litigants who seek judicial redress. He questioned the practicality and fairness of sanctioning legal practitioners based on case outcomes, noting that litigation inherently involves uncertainty. "Who determines what constitutes an appropriate case?" he asked, warning that penalizing lawyers for pursuing claims, especially in complex political disputes, could have a chilling effect on access to justice and legal advocacy.
While acknowledging instances of abuse within the legal system, including forum shopping and conflicting ex parte orders, Ubani cautioned against overcorrection. "Two wrongs cannot make a right," he noted, emphasizing that reforms must not come at the expense of constitutional safeguards.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Ubani firmly rejected any interpretation of Section 83 that suggests the judiciary can be sidelined in electoral matters. "So long as the Constitution endures, judicial power remains intact," he asserted, warning that any contrary view risks eroding the rule of law itself. He called for continued engagement among legal scholars and practitioners, underscoring the importance of robust debate in resolving what he describes as a critical constitutional question.
