Imagine that opposition parties decide to boycott the upcoming elections scheduled for next year. How would such a boycott affect the country and its democracy? Is a boycott the best option? Recent examples from Cameroon and Tanzania show that election boycotts by the opposition have not significantly altered the overall acceptance of election results. In 2000, Cote d'Ivoire experienced a massive opposition boycott that resulted in only 37.4% voter participation. Similar boycotts occurred in Gambia's parliamentary elections in 2002, Guinea in 2003, and the Ivorian presidential election in 2020.
Electoral boycotts have become a common tool for political opposition parties, particularly since the end of the Cold War. With the emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, the increase in contested elections has brought a corresponding rise in boycott decisions. In 1989, only four percent of all elections worldwide were boycotted; by 2002, that figure had risen to 15 percent. Between 1995 and 2004, an average of nearly ten elections per year were boycotted.
The Zimbabwean Example
The opposition to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe fractured over boycott discussions in 2005. That year, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) lost 16 seats in parliamentary elections, partly because indecision about a possible boycott kept MDC registration numbers low. Following this setback, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai made the fateful decision to boycott elections for the newly created Senate, claiming it would be a rubber stamp for Mugabe. This created internal tension within the MDC, as a sizable faction believed non-participation would be a critical error. The party splintered, Tsvangirai lost his mandate, and the ruling ZANU-PF party captured 49 of 66 Senate seats against the fractured opposition.
Tsvangirai managed to patch things up by choosing to participate in the 2008 elections, resulting in near-parity in seats between ZANU-PF and the MDC. However, he undermined himself in the presidential election. In the first round, Tsvangirai actually outpaced Mugabe, but the government claimed he fell short of the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a runoff. In protest, Tsvangirai boycotted the runoff, allowing Mugabe to triumph easily, turning victory into defeat. While the eventual power-sharing deal gave the MDC an unprecedented stake in government, Tsvangirai's boycott allowed Mugabe to retain the top position.
When Boycotts Can Be Effective
Given the logistical preparations required for elections, opposition parties must be encouraged to participate early to avoid missing registration windows or harming their electoral chances. Too often, opposition parties decide to participate too late to achieve full effect. The threat of a boycott can yield dividends, but opposition must still participate to receive full benefits. Choosing to sit out is almost always a losing proposition.
First, if elections receive significant international attention, a boycott can be effective. The opposition's threat of an election boycott, when it attracts international audiences, increases international pressure on the incumbent, forcing the ruler or ruling party to make concessions. The most striking example is South Africa's 1994 vote, when Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi's decision to boycott the election and denounce the process as unfree and unfair led to increased international pressure on Nelson Mandela. Consequently, Buthelezi's threat caused the abolition of the single vote system and amendments to the constitution regarding local self-government.
Second, if boycotts are part of the opposition's street protest campaign, they can pay dividends. If the opposition enjoys strong domestic popular support and a boycott is part of a broader campaign involving street protests and other activities, these boycotts can yield results. An example is the 1996 election and opposition boycott in Bangladesh. The Awami League, an opposition party, launched massive protests across the country along with a boycott two days before election day. The general opposition's boycott and ongoing street protests eventually pushed the government to hold a new election, which the opposition faction won.
The Nigerian Context
The slogan "Boycott the boycottables" was first introduced to Nigerian political vocabulary by Chief Mazi Mbonu Ojike (1912-1956). The slogan was a rallying cry for nationalism at that time. In practice, he generated greater enthusiasm for Nigerian traditional clothes by his "boycott" methods, which involved preferring traditional attire over English-styled clothes. However, Chief Ojike did not introduce the slogan for boycotting elections.
Chief Ojike was born in 1912 in Akeme, Arochukwu, in southeastern Nigeria. He attended Arochukwu Primary School, finishing in 1926, and took up a teaching appointment with a mission. He returned to college in 1929 to train as a teacher at the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Training College in Waka. A brilliant student, he won the 1931 college annual prize, a book titled Aggrey of Africa, the biography of the renowned Ghanaian educationist whose ideas of Pan-Africanism left a lasting influence on the young Ojike.
On leaving college in 1931, Ojike resumed teaching at Central School in Abagana. In 1933, he resigned to join the staff of Dennis Memorial Grammar School in Onitsha, becoming one of the few African teachers on the staff. His involvement in politics began in 1936 when he organized a successful teachers' salary strike after teachers were granted an increase that excluded junior members. He resigned from teaching in mission schools in 1938 in preference for private schools. That same year, he met Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, with whom he established a long personal and political relationship.
Chief Ojike left for the United States in 1938 to continue his education at Lincoln University. His stay there sharpened his political ideology, as he came together with other African students like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Together, they formed the African Students Association of America and Canada in 1941 to campaign against colonialism in Africa and injustices against the Black race. Chief Ojike was elected its first president.
His return to Nigeria marked active involvement in nationalist politics spearheaded by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had founded the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and whose newspaper, the West African Pilot, had become the vocal organ of the campaign for independence. Chief Ojike joined the NCNC and contributed articles to the Pilot. In 1949, he was fined 40 pounds on a charge of sedition for an article criticizing the colonial government for shooting 21 miners during a labor dispute at the Udi Coal Mines near Enugu.
In 1953, he was a member of the NCNC delegation to the London Constitutional Conference, which paved the way for Nigeria's independence in October 1960. The following year, he won an election on the NCNC platform to the Eastern Region House of Assembly, becoming the region's Minister of Finance; he held that office until early 1956. Mazi Ojike Mbonu died in 1956. There is now an Ojike Memorial Medical Centre at Arondizuogu, Imo State. In 1979, the proprietor of the medical centre, Dr. Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe, a close friend of Chief Ojike, honored me by appointing me along with journalist James Odafe Othinwa as co-director of the medical centre.
The 1964 Election and Boycott Threat
In 1964, the word "boycott" was effectively used for the first time in a general election in Nigeria. Since then, there has been debate over whether boycotts have any effect. In 1964, the NPC returned 60 of its candidates unopposed, which the NCNC challenged. On August 20, 1964, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was formed, comprising the NPC, the NNDP (controlling the Western Nigeria government), the Mid-West Democratic Front, and other elements, including Dr. Chike Obi's dynamic party. On June 3, 1964, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) was formed, made up of the NCNC and the Action Group.
Political enmity became apparent before and after the 1964 election. UPGA opposed the return of 60 candidates unopposed, including the Prime Minister, the Minister for Home Affairs Alhaji Shehu Shagari at Sokoto West; the Minister of Economic Development Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim at Konduga-Mafa; and the former Ambassador to Ivory Coast Alhaji Abdul Razak at Ilorin Town. Eastern Region Attorney-General Christopher Mojekwu, on a fact-finding tour of Northern Nigeria, said that for various reasons, 60 UPGA candidates in the Northern Region had been unable to file their nomination papers. It later emerged that more NPC men were being returned unopposed in the North as Northern Progressive Front candidates withdrew in seats such as Yerwa, where Minister of Commerce and Industry Alhaji Zanna Buka Dipcharima was the candidate; and in the seats of Speaker of the Federal House Alhaji Jalo Waziri (Gombe Central) and Federal Minister of Works Alhaji Inua Wada (Sumailia).
On December 21, 1964, the Central Working Committee of the NCNC rejected the 61 unopposed candidates in the North. Secretary FS McEwen said, "We do not regard these seats as won by the NPC," adding that the party had decided on a "course of action." The Action Group protested against the two NNDP unopposed candidates in Ife. Dr. Okpara, NCNC leader and Eastern premier, described election arrangements as a "farce." Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa described the NCNC as a "great liability to UPGA," saying that if they lost the election, they would blame the Action Group.
On December 22, Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission, Mr. EE Esua, admitted in an emergency broadcast that there had been cases where more than one candidate had been validly nominated "and yet names of candidates have been announced as returned unopposed." He appealed to all unauthorized persons to desist from making announcements on behalf of the Commission. Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro of UPGA led a delegation to President Nnamdi Azikiwe to postpone the election. The NPC warned UPGA not to drag the President into "politics." The tug-of-war between NNA and UPGA led to fears of a boycott by UPGA. Two members of Esua's Commission, Prince Akenzua and Mr. Anthony Aniagolu, resigned. Mr. Anthony Nnaemezie Christopher Aniagolu (1922–2011) later became a Justice of the Supreme Court and chaired the 1988–1989 Constituent Assembly.
On December 30, a "partial" election took place with "brisk voting" in the North, "moderate" in the West (where some polling booths were destroyed), very limited in Lagos (where booths were also destroyed and one man was injured in a riot), and non-existent in the East, where the UPGA boycott was complete. In the evening, UPGA issued a statement saying it would not accept any government formed on the basis of the elections, which would be "compromising and evil." It called on President Nnamdi Azikiwe to summon a conference of all political leaders to "break up the Federation peacefully." The NPC held a meeting at State House, Marina, Lagos, with President Azikiwe, with the objective of preserving federal unity.
On January 1, 1965, President Nnamdi Azikiwe, a non-executive president in a parliamentary system, announced that "attempts are being made to bring about a compromise on the question of forming a government." The text of the broadcast distributed to the press showed that the President had originally decided, to "arrest a situation which is rapidly deteriorating," not to exercise his constitutional power to call upon any individual to form a government, and that he would rather resign. He stated, "In my view, what will save our present political situation is to arrange for a free and fair election in the immediate future. All Nigerian patriots must hang their heads in shame today. The first national post-independence general election has been the signal for assaults on the Constitution and various acts of lawlessness hitherto unknown in the history of this country. As President of Nigeria, it is my view that the disruptive forces prevailing in the country constitute a situation which cannot be tolerated any longer. The all-embracing question is: do we wish to disintegrate as a united country, every region forming part of the Federation going its own separate way, or do we wish our country to be strong and united—a country that should command respect in the comity of nations? I should be falling in my duty as President of this great nation if I were to act literally on the results of this election. My honest opinion is that it would reopen old wounds, exacerbate feelings, prolong bitterness, and hasten the exit of unity and democracy from our beloved nation."
On January 2, 1965, while the NCNC announced that all its successful candidates had resigned their seats in Parliament, the NNA took the line that where elections had been conducted, they were valid, and that by-elections should only be held in the Eastern Region constituencies where no voting had taken place. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said that any complaints about improper conduct of elections should be made to the law courts and proposed a conference of all regional governments "to avoid bloodshed."
On January 4, 1965, the President announced after further consultations that the Constitution left him no alternative but to call on the outgoing Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form a new government that would be of "broadly based national" character. Stating that he was prepared to subordinate his own personal feelings, Dr. Azikiwe declared that the Prime Minister and he had resolved their differences and agreed that "the validity of elections can be questioned only by due process of law;" that in constituencies where elections had not been held, arrangements should be made to hold them as soon as possible; that in Western Nigeria, where the boycott had affected voting, "the results, in the interests of democracy, should be re-examined;" and that a review of the Constitution and electoral machinery would take place. Sir Abubakar immediately confirmed that he would form "a broadly based government" representing all shades of opinion. He said completion of outstanding elections in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions, as well as in Lagos, arrangements would be made to bring in new ministers and to make a general reassignment of all ministries.
On January 13, 1965, the ministers in Sir Abubakar's new government were sworn in by the President. Chief Okotie-Eboh and Dr. Mbadiwe, the two NCNC ministers, were not at the main swearing-in. On January 14, Chief Okotie-Eboh was sworn in. At a press conference, Dr. Mbadiwe said he boycotted the ceremony because he was waiting for his UPGA colleagues to join the government. On January 18, 1965, the NCNC announced after a meeting in Enugu that they had "rededicated themselves to the maintenance of democracy in Nigeria" and would give the new federal government "a fair trial;" however, the meeting was not attended by Chief Theophilus Benson. The Action Group, after a meeting in Ibadan, similarly decided not to defy Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa further. Reactions to the list were immediate. Chief Ladoke Akintola, Premier of Western Region and leader of the NNDP (the NPC's ally in the NNA), said that there had been no NNDP ministers in the first list because his party had decided not to release any names "until the whole list had been completed and adequate opportunity given to all the patriotic elements now working to assure the fullest unity of the people of Western Nigeria and Lagos in particular and the Federal Republic in general." On January 6, 1965, Dr. Okpara stated that new elections would be held in the Eastern Region as soon as possible and that if UPGA received an invitation to join the federal government, it would give it "careful consideration."
The following ministers were sworn in on January 7, 1965, by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa: Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NNA) — Prime Minister and External Affairs; Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu (NNA) — Defence; Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh (UPGA) — Finance; Alhaji Muhammadu Inuwa Wada (NNA) — Works and Surveys; Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (NNA) — Commerce and Industries and Transport; Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NNA) — Internal Affairs and Communications; Alhaji Yusufu Maitama Sule (NNA) — Mines and Power; Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (NNA) — Economic Development and Education; Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua (NNA) — Lagos Affairs; Dr. Taslim Olawale Elias (formerly NCNC) — Attorney-General and Justice; Dr. MA Majekodunmi (no party affiliation) — Health and Information; Chief J.C. Obande (NNA) — Establishments and Labour; and Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe (UPGA) — Aviation. Others were Alhaji Nuhu Bamali (NNA), Alhaji Usman Maitambari (NNA), Alhaji Hashim Adaji (NNA), and Alhaji Ibrahim Tako (NNA) — all Ministers of State.
The boycott of the 1964 election was averted because of the personal intervention of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the then President, and because the politicians understood the futility of a boycott. My advice to opposition parties is not to boycott. Choosing to sit out is almost always a losing proposition. Threaten, but participate.
