The Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development (CJID) has released a detailed investigation showing how social media, particularly Facebook, amplified communal violence in Plateau State between February and April 2026. The report, published under the Tech Justice and Platform Accountability Project, documents how unverified claims, threats, and graphic content circulated online, directly influencing real-world violence. The findings highlight a new and dangerous element in the region's long history of communal clashes: the speed and scale at which misinformation spread, outpacing official clarifications and fact-checks.
The First Reprisal: Barkin Ladi
The violence began on 23 February, when suspected Fulani gunmen attacked Dorowa Babuje village in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area, killing seven people, according to the evidence log compiled by investigators. Within hours, youths from the affected community blocked the main road. Security sources said four travellers were killed at the scene, while a fifth later died from their injuries. Two of the victims were from Jos North, a detail that soon reappeared in online discussions.
On Facebook, the violence unfolded in real time. A post by CMN (Civic Media News) on its Facebook page reported the roadblock and the killings, while a voice recording shared by one Murtala Mai Igiya captured a caller saying a traveller had been “finished.” The Hausa conversation spread faster than any official clarification. Amnesty International Nigeria later issued a condemnation of the killings. During the holy month of Ramadan, a different kind of violence began to circulate online: repeated claims that reprisals would follow after Eid.
The Digital Promise: Ramadan
A screenshot shared in the Facebook group Movement for the Protection of Plateau Heritage (MOPPLAH) warned that “after fasting, they will deal with them.” It was quickly treated as evidence of an impending reprisal. The original author, Sharfaddeen Bature, later said his words had been misrepresented and were not connected to Jos. By then, however, the inciting interpretation had already spread. Older material was also recirculated as current, including a February video of Christian cleric Ezekiel Dachomo warning that insurgents from Sokoto and Zamfara were in Plateau 'doing their fasting here,' reshared after the 29 March attack on Angwan Rukuba as proof of a premeditated plan.
An eviction threat was also revived from 2025, when the Facebook account Barrywhytesoftouch posted a message warning Hausa residents in Tudun Wada to vacate before 29 April. The Plateau State Police Command investigated the post at the time. The post was recirculated in 2026 out of context. By the end of Ramadan, the online tension had been sustained long enough to shape expectations.
The Explosion: Angwan Rukuba
At 8:19 p.m. on 29 March 2026, Plateau News Updates posted the first report that unknown gunmen had shot people in Angwan Rukuba, Jos North. Within hours, the violence escalated. Before the identity of the attackers had been established, a narrative took hold online and on the ground that the assailants were Hausa, Fulani, or Muslim. That assumption was enough to trigger a reprisal that targeted Muslims almost immediately. Videos circulated showing youths killing two commercial motorcyclists and burning their bikes. One was Haruna Ibrahim, a youth corps member and newlywed. The other rider has not been publicly identified.
Alex Barbir, an American evangelist working with Mr Dachomo, arrived at the scene shortly after the attack and said he had been nearby by chance. In a video recorded with burning bodies behind him, he alleged that Christians were being killed and that a genocide was unfolding, even though at least one of the bodies in view was that of a Muslim cyclist. His video was later shared by Adamu Garba II and others. Three days earlier, Mr Barbir had posted another video titled, “Is Allah a Bloodsucker?”, in which he misquoted the Qur’an and hadith while making claims about Muslims and violence. The video remained online.
The Inciters: When Words Become Weapons
Mr Barbir was not alone. A youth leader, Masara Usman, posted that “the issue of peace has passed” and alleged a Christian genocide. He also shared Mr Barbir’s interpretation of the Angwan Rukuba killings. In another video, Mr Dachomo was seen walking with a group of youths in Angwan Rukuba while voices in the background called for revenge. Other posts reflected similar sentiments. Kefas Pam questioned whether a community would be blamed for blocking roads to intercept “fleeing terrorists”. In a separate post, a user threatened unspecified action at the central mosque on Friday. Another account, using the name Ælîyū Førçê Güèrîllå, called on Muslims in Jos to defend themselves.
A video by social media personality Verydarkblackman (VDM), recorded in Angwan Rukuba, added to the tension. In it, he suggested that citizens should defend themselves. While the statement was not explicit, in the context of heightened tension and circulating claims, such messages were widely interpreted by users as justification for taking the law into their own hands. What followed was a further escalation of violence.
The Unravelling
On Wednesday, 1 April, a curfew imposed after the 29 March attack was relaxed. Within hours, violence resurfaced. In Jos North LGA, particularly along Nassarawa and Bauchi Road, unrest was reported. At Unguwar Rukuba Junction, a man identified as Alkasim Umar was shot dead. Residents later told Fix TV that he had been caught in the crossfire during a confrontation between individuals from different religious backgrounds. For several days, parts of the city remained tense. Roadblocks reappeared in some areas, while movement in others slowed amid uncertainty.
Alongside the physical violence, a surge of online content accompanied the unrest. This included unverified claims, graphic videos, some showing severely burned bodies, and posts containing inflammatory language directed at religious groups. A review of posts collected for this investigation shows that many of these materials remained accessible on Facebook during and after the violence. Several of these posts were reported by users. None were removed in a timely manner, or, in many cases, at all. While some users attempted to challenge or correct misleading narratives, the original posts continued to circulate widely.
What Misbahu El-Hamza Saw, and What Facebook Did Not Do
One journalist who attempted to counter the spread of misinformation was Misbahu El-Hamza. In the days following the attack, he published fact-checks clarifying that both Muslims and Christians were among the victims, and debunked claims linking an unrelated post to the Angwan Rukuba violence. His corrections, however, received significantly less engagement than the posts they sought to counter. When asked which piece of misinformation concerned him most, Mr El-Hamza pointed to a video by Mr Barbir, which framed the incident as a targeted attack against Christians. He said he reported the video to Facebook, but it remained online.
“Up until the time we spoke, it was still there,” he said. Mr El-Hamza suggested that platforms could do more to limit the spread of harmful content. He referenced Facebook’s COVID-19-era labels, which flagged posts containing unverified information, and proposed similar interventions for conflict-related content. “If a misleading claim is flagged early,” he said, “it can reduce how far it spreads.” At the same time, he emphasised that responsibility is shared. Governments, he said, must respond more decisively during crises, while journalists and content creators have a duty to verify information, avoid inflammatory framing, and adhere to ethical standards.
May 2026: Postscript
As this report was being finalised in May, new violence was reported along Mangu Road. Travellers were stopped and, in some cases, identified along religious or ethnic lines before being attacked. Videos from these incidents began circulating online shortly after. As with earlier events, several of these posts remained accessible at the time of writing.
The investigation, based on a structured evidence log of over 40 social media posts collected between February and April 2026, archived links, visual and textual analysis, one expert interview with Mr El-Hamza, and secondary reporting from media outlets including Fix TV, concludes that the consequences were not abstract. Haruna Ibrahim, a newlywed youth corps member, was among those killed after being caught in a reprisal attack. Alkasim Umar, who was shot during unrest on 1 April, and the unidentified motorcyclist killed and burned during the initial reprisals, represent similar patterns of violence unfolding alongside rapidly spreading narratives. The report calls for improved content labelling, faster response systems during crises, and real-time fact-checking tools, while emphasising that governments, media practitioners, and civil society actors all play a role in strengthening information integrity during periods of conflict.
