A new study by the University of Cambridge has documented that some Boko Haram fighters employed frontier artificial intelligence (AI) tools—including ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, Meta AI, and DeepSeek—to plan attacks, design explosive devices, and improve battlefield operations. The report, titled 'God has helped us, and so will AI: How the Terrorist Group Boko Haram Uses Frontier AI,' is based primarily on 57 interviews with 27 former Boko Haram members conducted in Nigeria's North-east between 2025 and 2026.
Study Methodology and Limitations
The study, authored by Antonia Juelich, a terrorism researcher at the Cambridge Programme on AI Science & Policy (CASP), presents what it calls the first field-based evidence of AI adoption by a terrorist organization. However, a review of the 93-page report by PREMIUM TIMES found that many central claims could not be independently verified and rely heavily on defector accounts. The researcher acknowledged these limitations, noting that several claims could not be independently corroborated due to Boko Haram's secrecy and difficulty accessing active members. The report provides no forensic evidence, platform records, or technical data linking Boko Haram directly to the AI systems identified, nor does it indicate whether the companies behind those products were contacted for comment. The researcher cautioned that the study cannot determine whether AI measurably improved Boko Haram's operational capabilities, documenting instead former members' perceptions that the technology made them more effective.
AI Use Beyond Propaganda
Unlike previous studies focused mainly on extremist propaganda, the report states that both Boko Haram factions—the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS)—used frontier AI across combat operations. According to former members, AI tools were used to plan attacks, improve operational security, troubleshoot weapons, provide logistical advice, and assist in designing improvised explosive devices. Some respondents also claimed AI helped commanders develop battlefield tactics and improve drone weaponisation. 'We mostly used it in three ways: the first one is to learn how to assemble and use guns and how to manufacture bombs,' the researcher quoted a former ISWAP commander. 'The second one is for surveillance, like how to improve our surveillance strategies to monitor what is happening in our camps and also to better understand our enemy and prepare attacks. The third one is to make plans, like, when we come up with new ideas on how to attack, we ask it for tactics on how to make it work in practice to be successful.'
Foreign Trainers and AI Units
One of the study's most consequential claims is that foreign Islamic State fighters allegedly introduced AI to ISWAP beginning around 2023. 'The white guys came and taught us,' Ms Juelich quoted a former ISWAP mid-ranking commander, clarifying he referred to operatives from Libya, France, and Arab countries with lighter complexions. Former commanders said foreign trainers supplied laptops, virtual private networks (VPNs), encrypted software, and paid subscriptions to multiple AI platforms while conducting training sessions for selected commanders. According to the report, dedicated AI units were established within both ISWAP and JAS to manage access to AI tools, train other fighters, and support operational planning. The researcher stated that insurgents learned methods for bypassing AI safety guardrails through prompting techniques taught by foreign trainers, allowing them to obtain responses that commercial AI systems are designed to restrict.
Call for Collaboration and Further Research
While the report stops short of prescribing detailed policy measures, the researcher urges governments, AI companies, and academia to work more closely to understand and respond to AI-enabled terrorism. 'The specific policy implications are beyond the scope of this paper,' the author wrote, noting the study intended primarily to present empirical findings. According to the researcher, greater attention should be paid to how terrorist groups could exploit AI for less dramatic but operationally significant purposes, including logistics, communications, tactical planning, and weapons troubleshooting. The author recommended expanded empirical research to determine whether AI adoption extends beyond Boko Haram to other Islamic State affiliates, al-Qaeda-linked groups, and non-jihadist armed organisations. She also urged AI developers and policymakers to involve conflict and terrorism researchers more directly in AI safety assessments, arguing that technical testing alone cannot adequately capture how militant groups make operational decisions or exploit emerging technologies. More broadly, the researcher argued that the findings should prompt governments, intelligence agencies, and AI companies to reassess assumptions about the pace at which terrorist organisations may adopt frontier AI technologies.
