The abduction of dozens of pupils and teachers in communities within Oriire Local Council of Oyo State and many other places has reignited debate over community security, private security proliferation, and the limits of the country's legal framework. Rotimi Agboluaje reports that the plan to set up a private security outfit, known as Iru Ekun, in Oyo State underscores the urgency of decentralised policing in Nigeria.
As parents waited anxiously for the release of their children and teachers in terrorists' captivity, public attention quickly shifted from the immediate tragedy to a broader and recurring question: Who protects citizens when the institutions constitutionally mandated to provide security appear overwhelmed? The incident has revived intense conversations around community policing, state police, regional security networks, and the legality of emerging security initiatives such as Iru Ekun (Leopard's tail), the outfit recently proposed by Yoruba Nation activist, Chief Sunday Adeyemo, popularly known as Sunday Igboho.
Beyond the controversy surrounding the proposed outfit itself, the debate reflects something much deeper: a growing public frustration with insecurity and an expanding gap between citizens' expectations and the capacity of existing institutions to guarantee safety. The Iru Ekun controversy is not merely about the security initiative. It is about the future of policing in Nigeria, the limits of the country's legal framework, and the increasing demand for localised responses to the rising web of insecurity across the country.
Shifting Security Threats in the South-West
For decades, security concerns in the South-West were largely associated with armed robbery, cultism, political violence, and occasional communal clashes. Those threats, while serious, were generally localised and manageable within conventional law enforcement structures. However, recent developments suggest a significant shift. A former Nigerian Ambassador to the Philippines, Dr Yemi Farounbi, believes the region is confronting a new and more dangerous security reality. According to him, the South-West is increasingly experiencing threats that resemble organised terrorism rather than ordinary criminality. "The unexpected is happening. It's no longer armed robbery cases; it's no longer banditry; it is full-scale terrorism," the elder statesman said.
Also, a lecturer at the Department of History, University of Ilesa, Dr Adebukola Ayoola, stated that the rising insecurity and the perceived failure of conventional security agencies have made the emergence of community-based security outfits such as Iru Ekun inevitable. Ayoola and Farounbi's assessments mirror concerns among many security analysts, who believe that criminal networks displaced from the North are relocating to forests and rural communities across the South-West.
Centralised Security vs. Local Realities
Terrorism requires capabilities far beyond those of conventional policing. It demands intelligence gathering, surveillance technology, counter-insurgency operations, sophisticated communications systems, and access to advanced weaponry. These functions are traditionally concentrated within federal institutions such as the military, intelligence services, and specialised police formations. Yet for communities under attack, insecurity is seen as a problem requiring immediate local solutions. This tension between a centralised security architecture and local security realities lies at the heart of Nigeria's current dilemma.
Whenever insecurity escalates in any state, public anger is immediately directed at the governor, as citizens expect state governments to act, deploy resources, and guarantee safety. Nothing illustrates Nigeria's security paradox more clearly than the position of state governors, who have no direct constitutional authority over the police, military, State Security Services (SSS), or other federal security agencies operating within their territories. The Nigerian Constitution places policing under the Exclusive Legislative List, making the Nigeria Police Force a federal institution answerable only to the president through the inspector-general of police. As a result, governors often carry the political burden of insecurity without possessing the operational tools needed to address it.
This contradiction has fuelled persistent calls for decentralised policing and constitutional reform. Supporters of state police argue that local authorities possess better knowledge of their environments and can respond more effectively to emerging threats. However, opponents remain cautious, frequently pointing to Nigeria's First Republic experience with Native Authority Police, which critics said were sometimes used to intimidate political opponents and suppress dissent. The fear is that state-controlled police formations could become instruments of political persecution. But as insecurity continues to spread, the argument in favour of a decentralised police system is gaining momentum, with the presidency buying into it as well. Recently, the federal government said it was working out the legal framework and modalities for its implementation.
Emergence of Community Security Outfits
Long before the current debate over Iru Ekun, Nigerians had already begun creating alternatives to conventional security arrangements. Across the country, neighbourhood watches, vigilante groups, hunters' associations, and community security networks have become largely visible. The creation of Amotekun in the South-West represented perhaps the most significant institutional response to this trend. Established through legislation enacted by state assemblies, Amotekun was designed to complement federal security agencies by providing local intelligence and rapid response capabilities. Despite initial resistance and constitutional controversies, the outfit has gradually become an accepted part of the region's security landscape.
For many communities, Amotekun symbolises the possibility of local solutions to local security challenges. Therefore, the emergence of Iru Ekun represents the latest phase in this evolution. However, unlike Amotekun, which enjoys legislative backing, Iru Ekun faces immediate questions regarding its legality, regulation, and oversight. The promoter, Adeyemo, has described Iru Ekun as a security initiative intended to flush kidnappers, terrorists, and bandits out of forests across the South-West. He said it had registered the outfit with the appropriate government institutions and was awaiting approval. He has also maintained that the proposed outfit seeks to collaborate rather than confront existing security agencies. But there has been no official confirmation from the Presidency, the Ministry of Interior, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), or any federal security institution regarding approval for the outfit to operate as an armed security organisation.
Legal Framework and Firearms Regulation
Registration does not automatically confer authority to conduct security operations or bear arms. Those powers are governed by constitutional and statutory provisions. The controversy extends beyond public declarations to the legal foundations upon which any security organisation must operate. Nigeria's legal framework governing security operations is clear. Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Firearms Act vest authority to regulate and license firearms primarily in the president and the inspector-general of police. The law does not allow the possession of prohibited firearms without appropriate authorisation. Military-grade weapons, including automatic rifles, fall under categories requiring special approval. Consequently, any organisation seeking access to such weapons must obtain authorisation through legally recognised channels.
Under the aforementioned Act, private security companies must obtain licences from the Ministry of Interior and operate under the supervision of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). More importantly, private security personnel are generally prohibited from carrying firearms. They may deploy communication devices, surveillance equipment, guard dogs, and other approved tools, but armed protection remains largely reserved for state security institutions. A communication scholar, Mr Angel Folorunso, agreed that the outfit can only operate lawfully if it functions as an unarmed, licensed private security company, adding that "any attempt to operate as an armed regional force would contravene existing laws." This legal reality lies at the centre of the controversy surrounding Iru Ekun, which intends to confront terrorists with sophisticated weapons.
The debate over weapons touches on fundamental questions of state authority and public safety. A Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Yomi Aliyu, said the government should not allow a private individual to form a militia organisation unless it engages that individual for a specific purpose, as was the case with Government Ekpemupolo, better known as Tompolo. Also weighing in, former Commissioner of Police and criminologist, Dr Sybil Olufunmilayo Akinfenwa, called for caution. According to the Security Studies lecturer, unrestricted access to firearms could create consequences far beyond the intentions of those seeking greater security. Akinfenwa argued that once multiple private actors begin carrying weapons, distinguishing legitimate security personnel from criminal elements becomes increasingly difficult.
Her concern reflects broader fears among security experts. History shows that armed groups created for noble purposes can evolve into threats if oversight weakens or political interests intervene. A national leader of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Abdulkabir Adesina Akinpelu, agreed with this argument, emphasising that private security companies are not legally permitted to bear arms under existing Nigerian laws. Private firms may partner with armed government agencies, he noted, but cannot independently deploy weapons.
Drivers of Private Security Growth
Despite these restrictions, public demand for local security initiatives continues to grow. Professor Oyesoji Aremu, a security scholar at the University of Ibadan, said the explanation lies in the perceived inadequacy of conventional security institutions, noting that citizens increasingly seek alternative protection because existing structures often appear unable to provide sufficient security. He identified several factors driving the expansion of private security services, including rising insecurity, unemployment, urbanisation, operational limitations within public agencies, and the emergence of non-state actors. The phenomenon is not unique to Nigeria. Across many countries, private security outfits have expanded dramatically over the last three decades. In some jurisdictions, private security personnel now outnumber public law enforcement officers. The difference is that such systems typically operate within clearly defined regulatory frameworks.
Lessons from Amotekun
The Amotekun experience in the South-West provides valuable lessons. Although the outfit enjoys considerable public support, it continues to face significant operational constraints. Funding constraints, limited access to sophisticated weapons, and restricted access to advanced surveillance technology, such as drones, satellite systems, and intelligence platforms, hobble its effectiveness. These limitations reveal a broader structural problem. Even where regional security initiatives exist, their effectiveness remains heavily dependent on federal cooperation. The emergence of Iru Ekun raises a critical question: If Amotekun already exists and requires more funding to operate effectively, what additional role would Iru Ekun play in the security architecture of the South West?
The Case for State Police
Ultimately, the whole conversation returns to the state police, which many analysts say represents a more sustainable long-term solution than the proliferation of private or quasi-private security outfits. A constitutional framework for state policing would provide clearer authority, accountability, and oversight mechanisms. It could also eliminate much of the ambiguity surrounding regional security initiatives, regardless of fears of abuse, ethnic tensions, and political manipulations. The debate over the propriety of Iru Ekun ultimately reflects a deeper crisis of confidence in Nigeria's security architecture. Every new vigilante group and regional security initiative triggers calls for state police, which points to the same reality: many Nigerians increasingly believe that security must become more local, responsive, and accountable.
The challenge for policymakers is ensuring that this demand does not undermine the rule of law. Security vacuums rarely remain empty, considering the high level of insecurity across the country. Where citizens perceive that the state cannot adequately protect them, alternative structures inevitably emerge. The question that then lingers is whether Nigeria's legal and constitutional frameworks can evolve quickly enough to regulate, supervise, and integrate these initiatives without compromising democratic governance. Should the law evolve to accommodate new security realities, or should the government first strengthen existing institutions sufficiently to restore public confidence? Until that question is answered, initiatives such as Iru Ekun will continue to emerge at the intersection of public fear, constitutional limitations, and the enduring search for safety.
