Gulf States Confront Strategic Dilemma Amid Escalating US-Israel War on Iran
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states find themselves in a precarious position, grappling with tough strategic choices as the United States and Israel wage a war against Iran—a conflict the Gulf nations had heavily invested in diplomacy to prevent. Now, their civilian infrastructure faces daily attacks, forcing a reevaluation of regional security dynamics.
Iran's Aggression Unites Gulf in Anger and Frustration
Ironically, Iran's broad retaliatory strikes have temporarily quelled concerns about existing divisions among Gulf states. In recent months, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had taken opposing sides in conflicts in Sudan and south Yemen. However, the current crisis has united the Gulf in anger at Iran's aggression, frustration with the U.S. for ignoring warnings, and confusion about the future.
Iran's deliberate targeting of infrastructure and U.S. bases across the Gulf reflects a calculated strategy. Commentators on Iranian state television have pointed to Kuwait's incomplete recovery from the 1991 Gulf War as a cautionary tale. The Islamic Republic appears to recognize that forcing the U.S. back to negotiations requires not only disrupting global energy markets but also damaging the Gulf's reputation for safety and stability.
Limited Options for Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC's six member states have no good options. Pursuing diplomacy too eagerly could anger a U.S. president intent on absolute victory and risk legitimizing a regime that has attacked the GCC on an unprecedented scale. This frustration has fueled speculation that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or even Qatar might join the war offensively against Iran.
Near-daily reports, often of Israeli origin and quickly denied, allege such operations are already underway. The UAE, having mounted a stellar defensive operation against Iranian strikes, faces pressure to reassert deterrence by striking Iranian targets. However, Emirati leaders remain wary of assuming a belligerent role due to the risks involved.
Saudi Arabia, absorbing fewer strikes and maintaining tighter information control, historically sees itself as a GCC leader and may seek opportunities to assert that role. While ideally leading to a diplomatic resolution, the Kingdom's military capabilities make it an attractive partner for Israel.
Competitive Dynamics and Strategic Patience
As the war continues, competitive dynamics among GCC states could reemerge. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are vying to position themselves as U.S. President Donald Trump's indispensable Gulf partner. If Trump signals interest in Gulf participation against Iran, leaders might seize opportunities to gain ground against rivals, potentially creating a domino effect if one state strikes Iran.
For now, the Gulf's priority is stopping Iranian strikes, reopening transit routes, and restoring energy production. States are acutely aware that if Iran emerges intact and un-moderated, it may be emboldened to pursue nuclear weapons. The UAE and Saudi Arabia will only support resolutions that meaningfully mitigate further Iranian threats.
The most likely near-term posture is strategic patience—an approach Iran has long favored. The UAE and Saudi Arabia will monitor the war's trajectory for signs of a cogent U.S.-Israeli strategy. If a decisive outcome seems within reach, they might join with air power or resources at a low-risk moment. If the conflict becomes a quagmire, they will push for diplomatic off-ramps acceptable to the U.S.
Long-Term Risks and Diplomatic Challenges
Strategic patience may be wise temporarily, but prolonged war erodes the Gulf's credibility as a stable global hub. However, if GCC countries push the U.S. toward diplomacy—aligning with Iran's strategy of coercing the Gulf to pressure the U.S.—it sets a dangerous precedent where future Iranian demands could be met through attacks on the GCC.
Alternatively, GCC states could consider partial decoupling from the U.S. to reduce their target status. Past hedging involved seeking partnerships with China, which has vital Middle East interests and hints at willingness to help resolve the conflict. Yet, China's primary concern is maintaining energy imports, achievable without major security investments or confrontation with the U.S., making strategic shifts unlikely unless regional order collapses.
Neither a Gulf-state offensive nor a war-ending deal is imminent. In the absence of a clear U.S. strategy, the Gulf will seek to shape events more actively. One or more states, independently or in concert, will eventually assert their vision for how the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran should conclude, navigating a complex landscape of diplomacy, security, and regional influence.
