The Nigerian Senate on Wednesday passed a constitutional amendment bill seeking to establish state police, a move aimed at addressing the country's escalating insecurity. The legislation proposes a state policing structure that would operate concurrently with the existing federal police system, marking a significant shift after decades of agitation.
Key Provisions of the Bill
According to the bill, the Federal Police Service will continue to be headed by the Inspector-General of Police, while each State Police Service will be led by a Commissioner of Police appointed by the state governor, subject to confirmation by the state House of Assembly. Clause 17 of the bill outlines the appointment, command, direction, and tenure of state police commissioners.
Section 17(6) allows a state governor to issue lawful written directives of a general policy nature to the Commissioner of Police on matters related to public safety and public order. However, to address concerns about political repression, Section 17(7) explicitly prohibits the Commissioner of Police from arresting, detaining, investigating, or deploying force against any person, political party, or group for criticizing the government, except in accordance with the law.
Section 17(8) provides a mechanism for the Inspector-General of Police or a state Commissioner of Police to request the Police Service Commission to review any directive deemed unlawful or inconsistent with national minimum standards. The provision also states that the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be ousted. Furthermore, Section 17(10) stipulates that a Commissioner of Police cannot be suspended or removed except for stated cause, following fair hearing principles, on the recommendation of the National Police Council, and with approval by at least two-thirds of the state House of Assembly members.
Federal Oversight and Transition Period
The bill also includes provisions for federal intervention. Section 15(10) allows the Federal Police Service to temporarily intervene in a state's internal security affairs if there is an actual or imminent breakdown of public order or public safety that the state police cannot or will not contain. This intervention may include temporary operational command of the State Police Service.
Importantly, the bill clarifies that existing regional security outfits such as Amotekun, Ebube Agu, and Hisbah cannot automatically become state police agencies. The bill states: "No existing state, local, community, vigilante, neighbourhood, traffic or other security outfits shall, by reason only of this Act, become a State Police Service or exercise police powers or bear firearms unless authorised in accordance with this Constitution and an Act of the National Assembly."
The bill will now be transmitted to the House of Representatives for concurrence. If approved, it will be forwarded to the 36 State Houses of Assembly for ratification, requiring approval by at least two-thirds (24) of the states to become law.
Expert Concerns: Risk of Abuse by Governors
Despite the safeguards, Professor Jibrin Ibrahim, a political scientist and development consultant, expressed serious reservations. Writing in Premium Times, he stated: "I am very frightened of the idea because the evidence that it would be abused is massive in spite of the assurances provided."
Ibrahim, a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Democracy and Development, argued that state governors would likely define "bad boys" as political opponents and critics. He noted that many governors already use federal law enforcement to target perceived enemies, and a state police force under their control could worsen this trend.
He recalled the 2018 summit on state police, where retired Police Commissioner Abubakar Tsav warned that "establishment of state police will signal the beginning of the disintegration of the country," as governors would use the institution "against their perceived political opponents." Tsav also cautioned that state and federal police commands might work at cross-purposes.
Ethnic and Religious Divides
Ibrahim highlighted the deep ethnic and religious divides in Nigeria, arguing that many governors might use state police to favor certain groups. He cited the intensifying farmer-herder conflicts, where some governors seek to expel or protect pastoralists, potentially deepening identity conflicts. As Tsav argued in 2018: "Our politicians are not civilised enough and tolerant of opposing views and cannot preside over a competent and impartial police force."
Counterarguments and the Path Forward
Some proponents argue that state police could counterbalance presidential control of the Nigeria Police Force. However, Ibrahim countered that federal institutions are generally more even-handed than state-level ones, citing stronger separation of powers at the federal level. He noted that the National Assembly can call the Inspector-General of Police to order in ways state assemblies cannot with state institutions.
Ibrahim acknowledged the police's structural defects, noting that a significant portion of the police budget is consumed at headquarters, leaving state commands dependent on governors for resources. He suggested that addressing this issue is easier than creating a fully state-controlled police force.
He pointed out that about 150,000 of the nation's 350,000 police officers are engaged in VIP protection rather than routine policing. Successive presidential directives to withdraw police from unauthorized persons have been ignored. Ibrahim urged President Tinubu to first address this challenge, stating: "The police are ineffective because too many of them are not available to do core police work."
Professor Jibrin Ibrahim is a professor of Political Science, development consultant, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Democracy and Development, and Chair of the Editorial Board of PREMIUM TIMES.
